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In the summer of 2017, a new method of funding startup 
businesses exploded from a small capital market to one worth 
billions. “Initial Coin Offerings” (“ICOs”) can appear to be a 
simple crowdfunding campaign or a public stock offering at 
the same time and, until recently, have been conducted with no 
regulatory oversight. Due to the high risk of fraud, the SEC 
has begun cracking down on ICOs, requiring many issuers to 
register their “ICO tokens” as securities or halt trading 
entirely. This Note looks at the regulatory precedents and 
factors that the SEC has considered to decide whether a token 
is a security, and proposes an alternative legal system to 
securities law that may be better suited for regulating certain 
types of ICO tokens. This Note concludes that, for ICOs that 
raise money for a decentralized autonomous organization—in 
which all token purchasers hold equal management rights—
uniform partnership law is the ideal mode of regulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Would you invest in a company in which all management 
is replaced by the remote control of all investors? That was the 
question “The DAO,” a conceptual investment fund designed 
to operate a decentralized autonomous organization almost 
entirely through digital code, asked the public.1 Participants 
buy in to the fund by purchasing digital tokens, then 
introduce, view, and vote on pitches; the company’s smart code 
then automatically executes the winning projects.2 The idea 
 
1 David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/ 
[perma.cc/3MFC-74HU] (last updated June 27, 2016, 5:52 PM).  
2 Id. 
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was to create a democratic enterprise, but the plan hit a snag 
when a hacker exploited the company’s code and trapped 
about $50 million of investors’ money.3 The implications of 
The DAO’s plan, and the magnitude of its ensuing failure, 
were large enough to draw the attention of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), leading to a decision that 
has since confused the future of blockchain startups4: tokens 
or virtual currencies sold in an Initial Coin Offering (“ICO”) 
might be treated as securities under federal securities law.5 
The SEC’s decision to evaluate The DAO’s ICO as an 
investment contract failed to properly take into account the 
innovative purpose of The DAO: to introduce an 
organizational form that is decentralized, autonomous, and 
democratic; a form closely resembling a general partnership, 
but open to the entire public. In its report on The DAO, the 
SEC may have placed a premature road block in the way of 
new blockchain business models by requiring such businesses 
to register with a central, responsible authority. While the 
SEC is trying to protect investors, the public may be better 
served by relying on partnership law to regulate decentralized 
ICOs. A new general partnership form should be recognized—
the “Decentralized Partnership”—with the potential to use 
blockchain technology to facilitate meaningful control across 
widely dispersed participants of all socio-economic 
backgrounds. 
 
3 Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed that the DAO Was All 
Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/ 
[perma.cc/AF47-X5XX].  
4 Blockchain startups refer to emerging companies with business 
models premised on the use of blockchain technology. Blockchain technology 
is a database system of creating, updating, distributing and maintaining 
records via a network of independent record-keepers, that eliminates the 
need for centralized storage systems. See Nolan Bauerle, What is 
Blockchain Technology? COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/ 
what-is-blockchain-technology/ [perma.cc/3DHX-XJPH]. 
5 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: 
THE DAO (2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf 
[perma.cc/RN28-FY3D] [hereinafter THE DAO REPORT]. 
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This Note will first define an ICO and place it in the 
context of federal securities law. Next, this Note will survey 
how three types of ICOs commonly made available to the 
public—(1) Utility Tokens, (2) Dividend Tokens, and (3) 
Decentralized Partnership Tokens—fit into current securities 
definitions. Finally, this Note will analyze the SEC’s report on 
the DAO and proposes an alternative solution: using a 
partnership form to define and regulate decentralized 
partnership tokens. 
II. WHEN ICO’S MIGHT BE SECURITIES 
From the Industrial Revolution to the Internet Age, new 
technologies have coincided with new financial markets.6 
Now, decentralized blockchain businesses have introduced 
the ICO market. In an ICO, a company raises money by 
issuing digital tokens in exchange for currency, typically 
Bitcoin or Ether. The tokens are blocks of code (often referred 
to as smart contracts)7 that give token-holders automated 
rights within the company, like participating in a service or 
receiving a share of profits. ICOs have been tracked since 
2003, but between April 2016 and November 2017, the all-
time cumulative sum of money raised in ICOs increased from 
$56 million to over $3.5 billion.8 However, as the market 
 
6 The rise of the limited liability corporation and the London Stock 
Exchange were essential prerequisites to the Industrial Revolution. See 
John Steele Gordon, How the Industrial Revolution Began, BARRON’S, 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-the-industrial-revolution-started-
1423887383 [perma.cc/44UJ-D24F] (last updated Feb. 13, 2015, 11:16 PM). 
New pension fund investment rules that allowed the meteoric rise in the 
availability of venture capital funds helped spur a new era of technological 
advancement. See generally Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture 
Capital, BUS. AND ECON. HISTORY, Vol. 23, no. 2, 
https://www.thebhc.org/sites/default/files/beh/BEHprint/v023n2/p0001-
p0026.pdf [perma.cc/VQ4P-2YF7]. 
7 Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/ethereum-smart-contracts-work/ 
[perma.cc/Z5LL-TW94]. 
8 All-Time Cumulative ICO Funding, COINDESK ICO TRACKER, 
https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/ [perma.cc/7AS6-42JL] (last updated 
Nov. 26, 2017).  
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grows, the fear of fraud and its impact on the economy grows, 
which in turn draws the attention of regulators.9 In response 
to the rapid ballooning of the ICO market, the SEC has 
attempted to fit nascent, experimental business models into 
decades-old rules. Such a regulatory approach can become a 
road block to innovation rather than the reasonable speed 
bump it is intended to be. 
A. Defining a Security 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) 
defines a “security” as, among other things, “any note, stock, 
treasury stock, security future . . . [or] investment contract.”10 
The SEC has clarified and defined these examples, in turn, 
through promulgated interpretations and judicial review of 
the scope of the Securities Act.11 When evaluating whether to 
regulate a new investment instrument, both the SEC and the 
courts consider the purpose of the Exchange Act, which was 
designed “to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated 
securities market.”12 As of the SEC’s release of The DAO 
Report release, the Howey Test for investment contracts (the 
“Howey Test”) has been used to determine whether ICOs are 
securities.13 
 
9 Once the securities market had clearly become large enough to affect 
interstate commerce, Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010) to protect investors and the economy as a whole 
from fraud and misrepresentation. Since the ICO market ballooned in the 
summer of 2017 and showed signs of large-scale fraud and hacking, the SEC 
has applied the Securities and Exchange Act to regulate many ICOs. See 
THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5; Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
10445, (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-
10445.pdf [perma.cc/YP4R-F9A2]. 
10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
11 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (“The 
task has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the body 
charged with administering the Securities Acts, and ultimately to the 
federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial transactions in our 
society come within the coverage of these statutes.”). 
12 Id. at 849. 
13 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
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1. The Howey Test  
“An investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person 
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
party.”14 The actual form of the contract is not a determinative 
factor, but instead the economic realities of the agreement 
should be paramount.15 Over time, the Howey Test has been 
broken down into four factors that must be met in order to 
declare an investment contract a security: (1) there must be 
an investment of money;16 (2) in a common enterprise;17 (3) 
with the reasonable expectation of profits;18 and (4) derived 
predominately through the managerial efforts of others.19 
The first part of the Howey Test may require asking 
whether the contract was entered into for purposes of 
investment profit or consumption.20 Similar contract forms 
can be classified as investments or consumption, the 
distinction depending in part on the economic purpose driving 
the transaction. In Forman, tenants entering into real estate 
contracts were not given the protection of the SEC in part 
because the arrangement was for the purpose of occupying the 
space rather than investing in its value.21 But in Howey, real 
 
14 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). Note that the 
Howey Test is used in the same way to identify securities under both the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act, as the definitions of securities 
in those acts are “virtually identical.” Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 
U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985). 
15 In keeping broad definitions, the Acts allow for new technologies—
like ICOs—to facilitate new capital markets. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 
332, 336 (1967) (“form should be disregarded for substance”); Forman, 421 
U.S. at 848–49 (“the emphasis should be on economic reality” and “Congress 
intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities 
underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto”). 
16 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. 
17 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49–52 (1st Cir. 2001). 
18 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394–96 (2004). 
19 SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
20 Forman, 421 U.S. at 858. 
21 Id. 
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estate contracts that primarily offered returns from 
harvesting oranges on the property were considered 
investment contracts under the Securities Act.22  
Additionally, the first factor of the Howey Test asks 
whether an investment was of “money.”23 The SEC has taken 
the position, with judicial affirmation, that “money” in this 
context is a fluid concept that can include goods and services 
like virtual currencies.24 
The second factor of the Howey Test asks whether the 
investment is in a “common enterprise.”25 Circuit courts differ 
on the proper approach for determining the existence of a 
common enterprise.26 Some circuits look to “horizontal 
commonality,” which requires shared interest of investors 
seeking to pool their capital to share profits and losses.27 
Other courts examine any “vertical commonality,” whether 
the returns on the investment are woven between the investor 
and the manager of the investment.28  
The third factor of the Howey Test looks into the 
“reasonable expectation of profits.”29 “Profits” here refers 
to the “profits that investors seek on their investment, not the 
profits of the scheme in which they invest.”30 These profits can 
be variable or fixed, and do not require cash returns such as 
dividends.31 Similar to the first factor, courts examine 
whether the investors were “attracted” to the contract 
 
22 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
23 Id. 
24 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
25 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49–52 (1st Cir. 2001). 
26 Id. at 49–50. 
27 See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“A common enterprise within the meaning of Howey can be established by 
a showing of ‘horizontal commonality’: the tying of each individual investor’s 
fortunes to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of assets, 
usually combined with the pro-rata distribution of profits.”).  
28 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49. 
29 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
30 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004). 
31 Id. at 394–95 (“‘profits’ in the sense of income or return, to include, 
for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of 
the investment”). 
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primarily by the promise of returns, regardless of the form of 
those potential returns.32 
The fourth and final factor of the Howey Test has 
broadened since Howey. Originally, Howey asked whether the 
profits were derived “solely from the efforts of the promoter or 
a third party.”33 The word “solely” has been replaced by circuit 
courts with a more flexible standard, “predominately.”34 
Courts have broadened this standard to prevent promoters 
from avoiding securities regulation by offering investor’s 
trivial participation rights in investment contracts.35 Circuit 
courts adopting this flexible interpretation of the Howey Test’s 
fourth prong have allowed the SEC to take jurisdiction over 
investment contracts that offer participation rights, and even 
impose obligations such as voting, active marketing and sales, 
and other methods of participation in the venture.36  
2. Partnership Stakes as Securities 
As a result of the expansion of the term “solely,” soliciting 
investors to join investment contracts as partners, either 
general or limited, can be treated as issuing securities.37 
 
32 Id. at 395–96. 
33 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (emphasis added). 
34 SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
Other circuit courts have used different words to convey essentially the 
same sentiment: that the profits need not be derived “solely” from the efforts 
of the promoter or a third party, and that some involvement by the investors 
in the profit-generating activity does not foreclose the finding of an 
“investment contract” under Howey. See, e.g. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479–83 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has not yet 
commented on how far the Howey Test may depart from “solely.”  
35 Sometimes these participation rights may appear substantial. For 
example, individuals who invested in the scheme in Glenn W. Turner 
Enterprises, Inc. had the responsibility and ability to pitch new investors 
and makes sales in furtherance of the scheme, but the court determined that 
these “rights” were a façade for fraud. Glenn W. Turner, 474 F.2d at 478, 
482. 
36 See id. at 482; see also SEC v. Merchant Capital, L.L.C., 483 F.3d 
747 (11th Cir. 2007). 
37 See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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Courts have often applied the Howey Test to partnership 
agreements to determine if such agreements are securities, 
with a special focus on whether the profits are derived from 
the efforts of others, or if the investor seeking securities 
protection lacks “meaningful partnership powers.”38 
Williamson v. Tucker, the leading precedent on Howey’s 
application to partnerships, states: 
[G]eneral partnership or joint venture interest can be 
designated a security if the investor can establish, for 
example, that (1) an agreement among the parties 
leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or 
venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes 
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the 
partner or venturer is so inexperienced and 
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is 
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or 
venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so 
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or 
managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he 
cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or 
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture 
powers.39  
The Tucker panel deduced this standard by surveying past 
courts’ determinations of when partnership agreements could 
be considered investment contracts, with a focus on the impact 
of a large imbalance in “meaningful control” between the 
partners.40  
Later courts have interpreted Tucker to stand for the 
proposition that control issues may arise when “investors may 
be so lacking in requisite expertise, so numerous, or so 
dispersed that they become utterly dependent on centralized 
management, counteracting a legal right of control.”41  
Additionally, the Tucker court’s reasoning is not limited to 




40 Id. at 419–24. 
41 United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 
Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423–24).  
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expanded it in Leonard to cover innovative, “relatively new” 
organizational forms like the LLC.42 The Howey Test, as 
applied to partnerships by Tucker, and with an emphasis on 
relative control as urged by Tucker and Leonard, may thus be 
a helpful lens to consider whether certain ICOs (like The Dao) 
should be regulated as securities. 
3. Stock-Like Investments Distinguished from 
Investment Contracts 
“[A]pplying the Howey Test to traditional stock and all 
other types of instruments listed in the statutory definition 
would make the Acts’ enumeration of many types of 
instruments superfluous.”43 The decision in Landreth makes 
it clear that applying the Howey Test is not always 
appropriate,44 which implies that lower courts and the SEC, 
when evaluating an investment instrument, should first ask 
a threshold question: to which instrument in the list of 
securities instruments should the one in question be 
compared. In Landreth, the instrument was called a stock, 
quite clearly resembled a stock, and so should have been 
treated as a stock rather than an investment contract under 
the Howey Test.45 
The court in Landreth “identified those characteristics 
usually associated with common stock as (i) the right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion 
to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value.”46 When an investment instrument bears 
such features and is marketed as a “stock,” it would be 
expected by the investor that securities laws apply.47  
 
42 Id. at 89. 
43 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985). 
44 Id. at 691–92.  
45 Id. at 693–94. 
46 Id. at 686. 
47 Id. at 693. 
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As not all ICOs function in the same manner as The DAO’s 
ICO, nor offer the same incentive structure, deciding bodies 
should keep in mind that there is not necessarily an 
appropriate one-test-fits-all approach for evaluating ICOs 
under securities law. As discussed below, some ICO tokens are 
so closely related to the traditional stock features outlined in 
Landreth that using a Landreth stock test rather than 
Howey’s investment contract test may more appropriately 
identify these tokens’ securities designation.48 
B. What Is an ICO? 
An ICO is a method of raising venture funding from the 
general public by issuing a unique digital token in exchange 
for some form of currency, often Ether or Bitcoin.49 The token 
confers some assortment of automated rights50 on the token 
holder in relation to the company issuing the token. A 
company will typically offer a finite number of such tokens, 
and then token-holders can resell the tokens and transfer the 
rights to other individuals. Though not legally required, the 
standard market practice is to issue a white paper that 
explains what the company does, what rights the company’s 
token or virtual currency provides, and how purchasers may 
expect to receive a return. The standard white paper also 
open-sources the code of the company’s blockchain so that 
purchasers can examine the security features and 
 
48 Id. at 686; SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
49 A common method of issuing a token through an ICO is by building 
the token on the Ethereum blockchain. The company issuing the ICO can 
create the token with a few lines of standard Ethereum code. Then they 
issue the token in exchange for Ether. The benefit of issuing an ICO this 
way is that the Ether can then be used to gain use of the Ethereum 
blockchain, which means the company does not need to build its own 
network from scratch in order to process and operate the tokens. For more 
information on Ethereum as a platform for ICOs, visit www.ethereum.org. 
50 Tokens operate as smart contracts—using the token unlocks certain 
source code that makes some action executable “automatically,” without the 
need for an intermediary to execute the contract. 
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functionality of the company.51 Companies and funds can 
raise millions of dollars and gain thousands of blockchain 
participants52 in a short amount of time through the ICO 
market. But while all ICOs raise money to fund operations, 
not all ICOs do so in the same manner.  
The market consisted of three distinct classes of ICOs in 
2017. Each of these classes offer distinct uses and rights in 
their ICOs, with varying degrees of opportunity for direct 
profit. 
1. Class One: The Utility Token 
The first class can be called the “Utility Token.” In this 
class of ICO token, the participants purchase tokens in order 
to become a customer of or contributor to the company’s 
blockchain service; any financial returns would come from the 
actual participation of the token holder in the service or from 
trading the tokens in a secondary market to others who may 
want to use the service. There is no right to a share of the 
company’s profits.53 Whether a Utility Token is a security is 
 
51 See, e.g., Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization to Automate Governance, 
https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf [perma.cc/NK6A-
YUHU]; see also 2017 BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL CURRENCY 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE, at E-4 (American Bar Ass’n ed., 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/cle/2017/spring/ce17
04btd.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/JUT9-8CRB]. 
52 The typical ICO is issued by a company with a product or service 
founded on an application of blockchain technology. Such technology 
requires a large network of users to contribute bandwidth and even 
participate in the activities of the blockchain in order to be useful. For 
example, the Bitcoin blockchain requires thousands of independent 
participants to verify transactions and mine new Bitcoin. In many ICOs, the 
tokens contain code that grants the token holder access to the issuing 
company’s blockchain, allowing participation in the activities of the 
company. See generally A Beginner’s Guide to Blockchain Technology, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/ [perma.cc/Z43D-T5S9]; 
Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings 
[perma.cc/WF7L-YRFJ] (last modified July 25, 2017). 
53  STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE 1, https://storj.io/sale-
terms.pdf [perma.cc/FGG3-BN44] (“Ownership of Tokens carries no rights, 
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difficult to predict as decisions are limited, but based on the 
DAO Report and a recent SEC decision regarding the 
Munchee ICO, the determining factors may be the 
functionality of the token and the manner in which the 
company promotes the token.54 
The Utility Token should not be presumptively considered 
a security by the SEC. Storj is a file storage company, and its 
ICO offers an example of a Utility Token. A Storj token holder 
can use Storj to buy or sell file storage on personal 
computers.55 The Storj token might not pass the first factor of 
the Howey Test—Storj token purchasers are not investing 
money. Purchasers are primarily motivated by the 
opportunity to participate in the Storj blockchain. Users must 
have Storj tokens in order to buy and sell file storage through 
the Storj platform. This is more similar to the consumption 
contract in Forman than the investment contract in Howey.56  
However, there is potential for Storj token purchasers to 
be motivated by money, so further examination of this token 
is necessary. The Storj token is likely considered an 
investment in a common enterprise, insofar as purchasing the 
token results in horizontal commonality—the token holders 
profit based on the activities of the network of token holders—
thereby satisfying the second factor of Howey.  
However, the third part of the Howey Test, the reasonable 
expectation of profits, is difficult to meet. The Storj White 
Paper makes clear that there is to be no expectation of 
profiting financially from the company’s activities; Storj 
 
express or implied, other than the right to use Tokens as a means to enable 
usage of and interaction with the Network, if successfully completed and 
deployed. In particular, you understand and accept that Tokens do not 
represent or confer any ownership right or stake, share or security or 
equivalent rights, or any right to receive future revenue shares, intellectual 
property rights or any other form of participation in or relating to the 
Network and/or Company and its corporate affiliates. . . .”). 
54 The issuer’s dogged promotion of their token as a for-profit 
investment and trading opportunity was a critical factor repeated 
throughout the SEC’s report. See generally Munchee Inc., supra note 9. 
55 STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE, supra note 53, at 1. 
56 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975); SEC 
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  
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solicits the Storj token as a means of engaging in the Storj 
blockchain.57 There may be derivative profits based on the 
holder’s actual use of the Storj token, but the Howey Test 
refers to “profits that investors seek on their investment, not 
the profits of the scheme in which they invest.”58 There are no 
direct returns from an investment in the performance of Storj 
as a company, like a dividend or some other profit share. A 
token holder must purchase Storj tokens, then create and 
provide storage space and a consistent Internet connection in 
order to profit; returns come from the amount of storage 
contributed by the token-holder, not the amount of Storj 
tokens owned.59  
The fourth factor of the Howey Test also fails to paint a 
Storj token as a security. Any profits derived from the Storj 
token is earned by user participation in the blockchain, not 
“predominately” from the efforts of the Storj promoters or 
third parties.60 If a token holder does nothing with his token, 
there will never be an expectation to profit. In fact, the holder 
may consume all tokens by purchasing storage space with 
them. The Storj developers have simply created a platform, 
and the token holders are members of the network who are 
free to profit or purchase based on their own agenda. It is 
possible that a secondary market develops in which token 
holders can sell their Storj for Bitcoin or other currencies at a 
profit, but these transactions would be independent of the 
initial offering of the token and there is no promotion or 
 
57  STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE, supra note 53, at 1 
(“The purpose of the Tokens is to facilitate the provision and receipt of data 
storage and related services. . . . you understand and accept that Tokens do 
not represent or confer. . . any right to receive future revenue 
shares. . . . The Tokens are not intended to be a digital currency, security, 
commodity or any other kind of financial instrument.”). 
58 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).  
59 It may be possible that secondary market trading could develop and 
become profitable for Storj investors, based on demand for the service. 
However, the positioning and marketing for why investors should buy Storj 
tokens is not to receive profit from trading, but to buy more storage space 
on other user’s disks. STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE, supra 
note 53.  
60 SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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marketing by Storj claiming that this practice would be 
profitable. So, any regulation thereof would be derivative (and 
outside the scope of this Note).  
The Utility Token model, as represented by Storj, is 
analogous to the franchise business model. Investors pay Storj 
for the right to use the Storj platform to buy and sell their own 
file storage space. Token holders are responsible for their own 
Internet connection, their own hardware, their own taxes, and 
ultimately, how much profit they can earn. Crowley v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co.61 and SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products 
Corp.62 dealt with how to evaluate franchise agreements as 
investment contracts. In the first case, the “contributions of 
franchisees significantly and substantially affect[ed] the 
profits expected from the enterprise,” and so the franchise 
agreement was not a security.63 Conversely, the economic 
reality of Aqua-Sonic Products Corp. was that the licensees 
had no sales experience and very little, if any, actual ability to 
control their sales.64 The Utility Token model falls closer to 
the Montgomery Ward Co. end of the franchise spectrum, in 
that the profits expected by a token holders vary in proportion 
to their contribution to the network, rather than by the 
number of tokens they hold. 
i. Differentiating Pre-Functional Utility 
Tokens by Marketing Messages 
In December of 2017, in its biggest ICO action since The 
DAO Report, the SEC ordered the California-based app 
developer Munchee to cease its ICO and return funds to 
investors.65 The Munchee token can be classified as a Utility 
Token, as its function was to facilitate payments for 
advertising and reward users for posting restaurant reviews 
in the Munchee restaurant-review app.66 The SEC found this 
 
61 Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1975). 
62 SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1982). 
63 Crowley, 570 F.2d at 881. 
64 See Aqua-Sonic Products Corp. 687 F.2d at 585. 
65 Munchee Inc., supra note 9. 
66 Id. at 4. 
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ICO to be a violation of section 5(a) of the Securities Act by 
promoting and selling an unregistered security.67 This 
decision should be narrowly read in regards to Utility Token 
ICOs, however, because the token did not actually offer any 
functionality at the time of issuance, and the overwhelming 
promotion of the token was as a vehicle for secondary market 
trading profits. These two factors separate the Munchee token 
from many other Utility Tokens. 
These issues with the Munchee ICO differentiate it from 
other ICOs like Storj in a way that skews the Howey Test’s 
third and fourth factors ((3)the expectation of profits derived 
(4) from the managerial efforts of others) against Munchee. 
While Storj white papers promote the Storj token as a means 
to engage with Storj services,68 Munchee explicitly advertised 
the prospect of token-value appreciation profits on secondary 
markets.69 A Munchee token purchaser could not actually 
participate in the service, as the token was not functional at 
the time of ICO issuance.70 But Munchee still promised to 
create an “eco-system” that would enhance and protect the 
secondary market value of the token, even before the token 
became functional.71 In sum, the SEC found Munchee token 
purchasers were motivated by the prospect of the token’s 
appreciation, not by a desire to use it in connection with 
Munchee’s products. And since the expectation of profit could 
only have come from Munchee’s business growth, their token 
clearly was a security under the third and fourth Howey Test 
factors. 
Munchee’s precedential value, therefore, may be limited to 
its facts. Promotions centered on the prospect of financial gain 
and limited token functionality were central to the Munchee 
case and will not necessarily be present in all Utility Token 
ICOs. The Munchee ICO, therefore, serves as an example of 
claims to avoid if an issuer of Utility Tokens wishes to avoid 
securities regulations. This is not to say that a pre-functional 
 
67 Id. at 2. 
68 STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE, supra note 53 at 1.  
69 Munchee Inc., supra note 9, at 4–6. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id.  
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Utility Token used to raise money for development of a 
network will always be a security under Munchee. The token 
promoter could “lock up” the token from being transferred or 
sold on secondary markets until it becomes functional, for 
example.72 This might decrease any expectation of profits 
during the non-functional period, which in turn might help 
avoid designation as a security. Either way, functionality and 
manner of promotion may become essential determining 
factors in SEC regulation of ICOs.73 
2. Class 2: The Dividend Token 
Polybius Bank held an ICO to raise capital for its 
regulated, blockchain-technology driven bank.74 The bank 
plans to offer traditional banking services like commercial 
banking as well as modern services like peer-to-peer lending, 
all without any physical location.75 The Polybius token issued 
in the ICO (“PLBT”) confers a “right to receive a part of 
distributable profits” of Polybius Bank.76 This type of token, 
distributed as a means of raising money in exchange for a 
 
72 For example, Storj used such a lockup of reserved Storj tokens in 
order to “rearchitect” their token system, improve utility and stabilize 
pricing. Storj.io, An Announcement About Storj Token Lock-ups, STORJ BLOG 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://blog.storj.io/post/168735310988/an-announcement-
about-storj-token-lock-ups [perma.cc/P4X6-JFW4].  
73 For more examples of Utility Token ICOs, see the white papers of 
Aventus (an event ticketing blockchain), Civic (an identity fraud prevention 
and know-your-client blockchain), and Unikrn (an eSports gambling 
blockchain supported by Mark Cuban). See ALAN VEY & ANNIKA MONARI, 
AVENTUS, A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED EVENT TICKETING PROTOCOL (2017), 
https://aventus.io/doc/whitepaper.pdf [perma.cc/V9J3-9WRW]; CIVIC 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., CIVIC WHITEPAPER (2017), 
https://tokensale.civic.com/CivicTokenSaleWhitePaper.pdf 
[perma.cc/NN9F-75NJ]; UNIKRN, INC., UNIKOINGOLD: A DECENTRALIZED 
ESPORTS GAMING TOKEN (2017), https://static.unikrn.com/ 
4242/unikrn_bm/doc/whitepaper_en.pdf [perma.cc/9T9Y-U3K6].  
74 See POLYBIUS, POLYBIUS PROSPECTUS: A PROJECT OF A REGULATED 
BANK FOR THE DIGITAL GENERATION (2017), 
https://polybius.io/media/prospectus.pdf [perma.cc/B3JU-6WL3] 
[hereinafter POLYBIUS PROSPECTUS]. 
75 Id. at 1. 
76 Id. at 3. 
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share of profit, is a “Dividend Token” and is facially the kind 
of investment an investor would refer to as a security. For this 
reason, a token marketed with the primary purpose of 
distributing dividends can be considered a security under the 
reasoning of Landreth, without necessarily resorting to the 
Howey Test.  
As discussed above, Landreth stands for the proposition 
that, while not all “stocks” are necessarily securities, 
investments marketed as “stocks” and having features closely 
resembling traditional stocks are covered under the Securities 
Acts.77 Though the holding in Landreth is limited to 
investments marketed as “stocks,” its reasoning regarding 
investor expectation and factual similarities between a 
Dividend Token and a traditional stock should establish a 
prima facie case that Dividend Tokens are securities. This 
should shift the burden to the token issuer to show that the 
token is not a security. After all, the securities test focuses on 
the “substance” and “economic reality” of the investment, 
rather than the “form.”78 The economic reality of a Dividend 
Token is that investors expect few participation rights but 
proportional profit-sharing rights. 
A Dividend Token like that issued by Polybius resembles 
non-voting common stock. The Polybius token explicitly 
confers the right to “receive dividends contingent upon an 
apportionment of profits”—one of the functional 
characteristics of stocks noted in Landreth.79 The Polybius 
token does not confer voting rights, although other Dividend 
Tokens do.80 Though the ICO price of the Polybius token was 
 
77 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (“As we 
have observed in the past, this definition is quite broad . . . and includes 
both instruments whose names alone carry well-settled meaning, as well as 
instruments of ‘more variable character [that] were necessarily designated 
by more descriptive terms,’ such as ‘investment contract’ and ‘instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security.’’”). 
78 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).  
79 Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; POLYBIUS, POLYBIUS TOKEN WHITEPAPER 
(2017), https://polybius.io/media/tw_en.pdf [perma.cc/NS9E-5JPX] 
[hereinafter POLYBIUS WHITEPAPER]. 
80 Polybius Whitepaper, supra note 79. For a list of more Dividend 
Tokens and their features, see Jim Reynolds, Which Cryptocurrencies Pay 
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set at ten dollars per token, the price in secondary trading is 
negotiable and the tokens have the capacity to appreciate in 
value based on the outlook on dividend value.81 It is unclear 
whether, at this time, the tokens may be pledged or 
hypothecated. 
With such a close comparison to a traditional stock, and 
with the primary investment purpose of distributing profits, 
Dividend Token issuers should be on notice that their tokens 
are securities. In fact, the Polybius white paper contains a 
disclaimer that implies that Polybius believes its token is a 
security under U.S. law, and seems to be seeking Regulation 
S safe harbor by barring U.S. persons from purchase.82  
Since investors will look at these ICOs and believe that 
they look very much like common stock, Dividend Token 
issuers like Polybius have acknowledged that U.S. securities 
laws apply and—unlike Polybius—have opted to register their 
ICOs.83 
3. Class 3: The Decentralized Partnership Token 
Imagine a driverless car that picks up and drops off 
passengers who hail it through an app in exchange for a fee. 
Now imagine there is no central owner or operator of the car, 
but instead a decentralized network of investors who 
automatically receive a portion of the profits earned by the 
car.84 The business is decentralized, meaning no single entity 
 
Dividends?, INVESTITIN.COM (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.investitin.com/cryptocurrency-dividends/ [perma.cc/E629-
38HZ].  
81 POLYBIUS PROSPECTUS, supra note 74, at 3.  
82 Id. at 20. Whether in practice the ICO actually complied with 
Regulation S is outside the scope of this Note, as it deals with the 
administrative challenges of pseudonymous blockchain transactions. 
83 Jaron Lukasiewicz, The Basics on FACTS: A New Model for 
Compliant ICOs, COINDESK (Oct. 29, 2017, 3:04 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/basics-facts-new-model-compliant-icos/ 
[perma.cc/WS25-NBJB]. 
84 This thought experiment is often used to explain the concept of a 
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has control. Rather, the entire network of participants owns 
control. It is autonomous because there is no human operator, 
instead the business is run by automatically executable code. 
The only human intervention is in the initial coding and 
promotion. It is an organization because of the common rights 
and purposes of the investors. DAO business models are 
possible today (although not yet in driverless cars) by using 
the Ethereum blockchain platform and ICOs, but they create 
a unique regulatory challenge. 
“The DAO” is the most notorious example of such a 
business model. The DAO was set up to function as an open-
source, decentralized venture capital fund (though not limited 
only to venture investments). First, The DAO was created 
with simple, vague code, just enough to demonstrate the 
concept and issue an ICO. In the ICO, The DAO raised 
millions of dollars from thousands of investors, who became 
the network of decentralized token holders and de facto 
operators of The DAO fund. After that, the goal was to have 
the token holders introduce code to finalize the executory 
capabilities of the fund. Every token holder had the right to 
be a “Contractor” and “pitch” a block of code that represents a 
smart contract investment (a hypothetical example could be 
code that automatically invests $10 million of DAO funds into 
the S&P 500 and then winds down the investment 
automatically by $1 million each month, distributing any 
profits to token holders).85 The DAO used “Curators” to ensure 
the code does what it intends to do and control the pace of 
pitches. Then, token holders voted on each smart contract 
pitch. If a pitch reached quorum, the code would automatically 
execute the smart contract.86  
There was to be no management, only the maintenance 
“Curators.” There were no management fees or profit 
participation fees. There was no planned gap between owning 
the fund token and controlling the fund activities. When 
investors purchased a DAO token, they did so for three 
reasons: (1) to profit from the fund’s investments; (2) to control 
 
85 See Jentzsch, supra note 51, at 2. 
86 Id. 
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the fund’s investments; and (3) to participate in an 
experimental business model that can set an example for 
innovation in other markets. 
After a hacker exposed a flaw in The DAO’s underlying 
code to trap $50 million (all of which was later returned to 
investors using the advantageous features of the blockchain), 
the SEC determined that the DAO ICO was an illegal sale of 
unregistered securities.87 The SEC further advised that many 
other ICOs might be treated as securities, and that issuers 
should seek counsel in registering their tokens as such.88  
III. THE SEC MISUNDERSTANDS THE DAO 
After The DAO was hacked, the SEC issued an 
investigative report stating that The DAO ICO constituted a 
security issuing, and therefore should have complied with 
federal securities laws.89 They argued that under the 
framework of the Howey Test, The DAO investors invested 
money in the common enterprise with the expectation of 
profiting on the managerial efforts of others, and did not 
themselves have meaningful control over the enterprise.90 In 
focusing on the efforts of the Curators, the SEC erred in their 
fact-finding, resulting in a misguided application of the 
“managerial efforts” factor of the Howey Test. 
A. The First Factor: Investment of Money 
Under the first factor of the Howey Test, the SEC 
determined that there had been an “investment of money.”91 
The “investment” aspect of participation in the ICO is 
obvious—purchasers sought a return on their contribution. 
The novel issue was whether crypto-currencies like Bitcoin 
and Ether are “money.” The SEC resolved this issue by relying 
on two precedents, Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor 
 
87 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5. 
88 Id. at 2. 
89 Id. at 1  
90 Id. at 11–13. 
91 Id. at 11. 
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Freight, Inc. and SEC v. Shavers, to argue that virtual 
currencies are money.92 Supporters of Bitcoin and Ether will 
not likely argue with this position, because it further 
legitimates the virtual currency market. At some point in the 
transaction, fiat currency must have been exchanged to 
procure the Ether (which has a fiat currency value) and invest 
in The DAO token. DAO token purchasers indisputably 
invested money in The DAO token. 
B. The Second Factor: A Common Enterprise 
While the SEC acknowledges “common enterprise” as part 
of the definition of an investment contract security, it does not 
discuss whether the DAO ICO is a common enterprise, instead 
skipping to a discussion of the “managerial effort of others” 
factor.93 This may be because horizontal commonality seems 
self-evident—each DAO investor’s success is tied to the 
success of the other investors. But vertical commonality here 
is more debatable, and some courts rely primarily on vertical 
commonality.94 
“A common enterprise within the meaning of Howey can be 
established by a showing of ‘horizontal commonality’: the 
tying of each individual investor’s fortunes to the fortunes of 
the other investors by the pooling of assets, usually combined 
with the pro-rata distribution of profits.”95 The DAO concept 
fits this description of a common enterprise. The success of an 
investment in The DAO is made possible by the investment of 
the pool of Ether contributed by all investors. All profits are 
distributed equally across each token, and each token holder 
receives a pro rata share of profits depending on the number 
 
92 Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 574 
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that cash is not the only form of investment 
recognized under the Howey Test); SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 
WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (holding that an investment of 
Bitcoin, a virtual currency, meets the first prong of Howey).  
93 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
94 See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing the 
use of horizontal and vertical commonality standards by different courts).  
95 Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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of tokens held. In some courts, this will be sufficient to satisfy 
the common enterprise portion of Howey. 
Other courts will accept vertical commonality to show a 
common enterprise. In vertical commonality schemes, “an 
investor’s fortunes are tied to the promoter’s success rather 
than to the fortunes of his or her fellow investors.”96 The 
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits recognize broad vertical 
commonality, which requires a showing that the investor’s 
returns are “tied to the efficacy of the promoter.”97 The court 
in Villeneuve found vertical commonality because the 
investors could not succeed without advertising services 
provided by the promoters of the scheme.98 The Ninth Circuit, 
in cases where there is no horizontal commonality, will look to 
“a strict version of vertical commonality,”99 which requires 
that investors' fortunes be "interwoven with and dependent 
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment 
or of third parties."100 In such an evaluation, the court looks 
deeper than the contributions of the promoter to the scheme, 
instead focusing on whether the results of the promoters’ 
efforts generate the results of the investment. 
The DAO ICO might satisfy broad vertical commonality. 
The Villeneuve court found vertical commonality in a scheme 
where the promoters “provide[d] advertisements, training, 
products, and [selected] the areas where products are sold,” 
adding that “[t]he failure to provide any of these services 
would definitely determine the success or failure of the 
 
96 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49. 
97 Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 
1124 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated by reh'g en banc, 730 F.2d 1403 (1984) 
(quoting SEC v. Koscot Int’l, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
Although the Eleventh Circuit's en banc rehearing technically vacated its 
original Villeneuve opinion, the full court reached the same result and 
issued a cursory per curiam opinion that implicitly accepts the original 
panel's more fully explicated reasoning. See Villeneuve v. Advanced 
Business Concepts Corp., 730 F.2d 1403, 1404 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
98 Id. 
99 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1459 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
100 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
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scheme.”101 The causal link between the contribution of the 
promoters and the sales efforts of investors (who were like 
franchisees in the Villeneuve scheme) seems tenuous, yet the 
court deemed the Villeneuve scheme to be a common 
enterprise.102 The DAO Curators offer similar threshold 
services, like approving pitches for voting.103 Without Curator 
approval, token holders cannot vote on a smart contract pitch. 
Neglecting curation would undoubtedly cause the failure (or 
at least stagnation) of the scheme, so broad vertical 
commonality is satisfied here. 
However, strict or narrow vertical commonality is not easy 
to apply in this case. In a case in which an investor’s funds 
would not be pooled—i.e. no horizontal commonality—the 
Ninth Circuit found a common enterprise where the success 
of the investor’s investment depended upon the success of the 
promoter’s “business operations.”104 Arguably, this is not the 
case in The DAO. First, the founders of The DAO provided the 
minimum code necessary for token purchasers to be able to 
work together to build their funds. Afterwards, there is no 
more relationship between the investors and the founders, so 
investors’ success depends on the new execution code they 
approve and the investments they choose, independent of the 
founders. 
The Curators were closer to the success of the investors, 
because they were tasked with ensuring that pitches were 
suitable for implementation. Investor success required 
Curators’ services, but was not dependent on those services. 
An investment could have been approved by Curators and 
then denied by voters, or approved by voters and be a failure, 
in each case regardless of the Curators’ operation. Further, 
the Curators were replaceable by token-holding voters, which 
further separated Curator performance and investor success. 
A final argument against both modes of vertical 
commonality is that the Curators do not create verticality at 
 
101 Villaneuve, 698 F.2d at 1124. 
102 Id.  
103 Jentzsch, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
104 El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1974).  
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all, but rather are within the same horizontal, decentralized 
structure of the DAO. Decentralization is the essential 
concept of the business model. Further, the Curators are 
facilitators chosen by the token holders, but do not have power 
to control the token holders. The Curators’ primary purpose is 
to protect minority token holders from attack by a majority 
token holder (like voting to take all of the funds, which, in fact, 
almost occurred before it was stopped by the Curators).105 One 
DAO Curator describes his role as “human-training wheels” 
and envisions a future where Curators are no longer 
necessary at all.106 Another Curator saw an even smaller role 
in protecting from majority attacks, which is just to certify 
“whether payment addresses are truly associated with 
proposals” and whether code meets security standards—
Curators are not to make a decision based on the profitability 
of a proposed contract.107 Hence, Curator control is merely 
procedural, not substantial. 
In most courts, a lack of strict vertical commonality would 
not defeat the common enterprise factor, since horizontal 
commonality exists. This may be why the SEC left the 
common enterprise factor out of the DAO report. However, the 
discussion of vertical commonality raises important 
challenges to the SEC’s application of the final Howey factor, 
the managerial effort of others. 
C. The Third Factor: The Reasonable Expectation of 
Profits 
The third factor’s application to The DAO is relatively 
straightforward, and therefore only received a short 
paragraph of discussion in the SEC Report.108 DAO investors 
were driven to the novel investment model by the potential 
financial returns. “Profits” means “[p]rofits in the sense of 
 
105 Jentzsch, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
106 Andrew Quentson, Are The DAO Curators Masters or Janitors?, 
COINTELEGRAPH (June 12, 2016), https://cointelegraph.com/news/are-the-
dao-curators-masters-or-janitors [perma.cc/ALW2-KZ2A]. 
107 Id. 
108 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
2018.2_OREN_FINAL  
642 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other 
periodic payments, or the increased value of the 
investment.”109 The value of a DAO Token could increase and 
the token may be traded on another virtual exchange for 
Bitcoin or possibly even U.S. dollars. At some point in the 
transactional chain, the return on a DAO investment has real 
liquidity. There is no doubt that DAO token purchasers 
invested money with the reasonable expectation of profits. 
A counterpoint to note, however, is that profit is not the 
exclusive purpose for investing in The DAO. There are other 
virtual currency funds that invest in blockchain technologies, 
but operate more like traditional hedge funds.110 The 
difference with The DAO arise in the ownership of control and 
in the potential to explore the most ambitious possibilities of 
smart contracts and blockchain technology—like automating 
investments to execute with no human staff. While this does 
not overcome the expectation of profits, the numerous, 
experimental motivations behind The DAO should help guide 
the SEC in their evaluation of a DAO ICO. After all, Landreth 
lends precedent to the idea that whether investors expect the 
protection of securities regulations are relevant to the 
application of the Securities Acts.111 
D. The Fourth Factor: The Managerial Efforts of 
Others 
The most controversial factor in the SEC’s application of 
the Howey Test to The DAO is the fourth factor. The SEC 
argued that “The efforts of Slock.it, Slock.it’s co-founders, and 
The DAO’s curators were essential to the enterprise,” thereby 
 
109 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).  
110 Taas is a crypto-hedge fund that distributes twenty-five percent of 
its profits from investing in blockchain assets. There are more recent crypto-
investment funds as well that charge traditional management and profit 
participation fees. See Reynolds, supra note 80; Ash Bennington, Crypto 
Hedge Fund Costs? Invest $100k and Here’s How Much You’d Pay, 
COINDESK (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/crypto-
hedge-fund-costs-invest-100k-and-heres-how-much-youd-pay/ 
[perma.cc/TYX4-U4D8]. 
111 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).  
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satisfying the managerial-efforts-of-others factor.112 Further, 
the SEC found that the “token holders’ voting rights were 
limited,” while drastically downplaying the importance of the 
token holders’ “Contractor” power.113 This is where the SEC 
erred. The SEC’s interpretation of DAO procedure is 
antithetical to the concept of the DAO and distorts the 
economic realities of the investment. This misinterpretation 
of facts has led to a misapplication of the law. 
1. The Efforts of Slock.it, Slock.it’s Co-Founders, 
and The DAO’s Curators  
Slock.it is the group of coders responsible for initiating The 
DAO. They wrote the code, issued and promoted the ICO, 
chose the initial Curators and suggested the first pitch, then 
stepped back to a role limited to answering technical 
questions about how to participate in The DAO.114 The SEC 
decided that these were the “undeniably significant” efforts 
that were “essential” to the “failure or success of the 
enterprise.”115 While it is undeniably true that The DAO could 
not have formed without initial programming, the SEC 
overstated the ongoing involvement of Slock.it, but neglected 
to consider the founders’ future intent to step aside as soon as 
the code was running, and even to replace Curators with 
token-holder-generated code when possible.116 The economic 
reality of the scheme was that Slock.it and the Curators only 
contributed to the maintenance of the system, while the 
“failure or success of the enterprise”—returns on 
investments—depend long-term upon the token-holding 
investors themselves. 
This part of the Howey Test no longer requires the success 
of the investment to be derived “solely” from the managerial 
 
112 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12. 
113 Id. at 13. 
114 Id. at 12. 
115 Id. (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 
(9th Cir. 1973)). 
116 Quentson, supra note 106. 
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efforts of the promoter or third parties.117 Investors can 
participate in the scheme by means of contributing sales 
activities or voting on governance, and the investment 
contract may still be deemed a security.118 However, the limits 
of just how far the law has moved away from “solely” are 
unclear. The D.C. Circuit suggests a temporal rule for when 
the managerial efforts of others is insufficient.119 In this 
circuit, an “on-going” common enterprise between the 
investors and managers must be present: “[1] pre-purchase 
services cannot by themselves suffice to make the profits of an 
investment arise predominantly from the efforts of others, and 
that [2] ministerial functions should receive a good deal less 
weight than entrepreneurial activities.”120  
The SEC found the contributions of Slock.it essential and 
the powers of the Curators substantial.121 They argued that 
Slock.it’s coding, marketing, ongoing technical support, and 
promise to put forth the first investment project created an 
expectance of token-holder reliance upon their managerial 
efforts.122 Additionally, they found that the Curators’ task to 
white-list or block Contractor pitches overpowered any 
realistic ability for the token holders to exercise control, while 
downplaying the ability for token holders to replace 
Curators.123 
The coding of the DAO by Slock.it and the appointment of 
initial Curators were merely pre-purchase efforts.124 After 
purchase, additional code was to be offered by token holders 
(when a token holder pitches a smart contract for code to be 
inserted after a vote, that token holder is referred to as the 
 
117  Glenn W. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482. 
118 See id. at 480 (the investor becomes the salesman in the scheme); 
see also SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2007). 
119 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
120 Id. at 588. 
121 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 13. 
124 The SEC did not discuss the temporal aspect of the initial setup 
contributions of Slock.It. See THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12. 
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“Contractor” for that pitch).125 Any on-going involvement was 
intended to be—and in reality was—ministerial, not 
entrepreneurial. Slock.it provided technical support; 
Curators, even in their screening of pitches, offered only 
security clearance and compliance. Only token holders—the 
investors—were entitled to put forth the entrepreneurial 
efforts and ideas necessary for profit. In practice, Slock.it and 
the Curators (many of whom helped create the Ethereum 
blockchain) functioned as they promised in the white paper: 
they intervened in the code using a hard fork to stop a hack 
from exploiting minority token holders.126 Security is not an 
entrepreneurial effort; it is a ministerial one. Security does 
not continuously increase the value of the investment; it is 
already priced-in to the purchase price of the token. Even 
screening pitches for security-proper integration with the 
DAO code does not overshadow the predominance of the 
investors’ efforts. 
The Fourth Circuit provides a convenient analogy to the 
managerial efforts in The DAO: “[i]f the investment scheme 
[is] merely to raise cattle for slaughter, the interests 
purchased by the [investors] may not [constitute] investment 
contracts.”127 Raising the cow is a pre-purchase contribution. 
Slaughtering the cow and profiting off the meat is the ongoing 
effort, and the investors have the practical skill and ability to 
realize these profits without the rancher.128  
In the DAO case, the code is the cow. Slock.it raised the 
code only to the point where additional experience and input 
was needed. The investors could “hire others to care for the” 
code—Curators—and still the arrangement would not 
 
125 Jentzsch, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
126 A hard fork is a blockchain management method which asks each of 
the record keepers to agree to change the historical information in the 
blockchain, and can essentially undo unwanted transactions. Matthew 
Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/ 
[perma.cc/YMY9-FY3Z]. 
127 Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 923 (4th Cir. 1990). 
128 Id. at 923–24. 
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constitute an investment contract.129 The token holders are 
ultimately responsible for and (as discussed below) practically 
capable of exercising the necessary controls to slaughter the 
cow—code, pitch, and vote for investments—and realize 
returns. The pre-purchase contributions of Slock.it and the 
Curators are simply not the meat of the efforts needed to 
realize profit.130 
Cases in which the pre-purchase efforts of managers 
satisfied the managerial efforts factor of Howey involved 
“significant post-purchase efforts.”131 Post-purchase, Slock.it 
only provided “ministerial efforts” like answering technical 
questions on token-holder forums.132 These were helpful in 
the development of the technology, but not essential to the 
profitability of future investments. The Curators were tasked 
with ensuring the security and honesty of the code as well as 
protecting the voting rights of the minority token holders, 
which is purely ministerial.133 Neither the post-purchase 
contributions of Slock.it nor the Curators can be considered 
“substantial improvements” to the scheme.134 Rather, they 
serve only as general maintenance. As such, the managerial 
efforts necessary to satisfy the final factor of the Howey Test 
are not present—just as they are not present when a rancher 






130 The Fourth Circuit differentiates between schemes in which the 
pre-purchase selection of assets, like choosing cow embryos, is essential to 
the success of the enterprise and those, like raising the cow for slaughter, 
in which the investors are capable of exercising control over the on-going 
enterprise. Id. Slock.it founders do not contribute enough code pre-purchase 
for The DAO to make any decisions. All asset selection is left up to the token 
holders, with Curators only serving ministerial purposes. 
131 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
132 Id.; see THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.  
133 Jentzsch, supra note 51, at 2–3.  
134 Life Partners, 102 F.3d at 588 (quoting McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 
204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975)). 
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2. The Expansive Rights of The DAO Token 
Holders 
The SEC further found that, under the managerial efforts 
factor of the Howey Test, the voting rights of the token holders 
were limited.135 These limitations made token holders more 
reliant on managerial efforts.136 This determination 
substantially underestimates the control rights conferred to 
token holders. Further, the SEC only makes a cursory 
exploration of the applicability of the Tucker court’s 
partnership agreement evaluation.137 A closer look at the 
comprehensive rights and protections afforded token holders, 
in the context of a horizontal relationship with Curators, will 
show that token holders held the essential control of the 
enterprise. This is especially true when considering 
expectations of how The DAO would operate in the future. 
When evaluating joint ventures and partnerships as 
investment contracts, courts add additional inquiries under 
the managerial effects factor of Howey, assessing how the 
partnership agreement actually distributes partnership 
power.138 Whether the investors had expectations of reliance 
on the entrepreneurial efforts of the promoters or third parties 
at the time of entering the contract is relevant.139 But, in order 
to demonstrate that the joint business venture is not an 
investment contract, the investors must show that, when 
considering the economic reality, they held “meaningful 
control.”140  
The SEC determined that DAO tokens “did not provide 
[investors] with meaningful control over the enterprise, 
because (1) DAO Token holders’ ability to vote for contracts 
was a largely perfunctory one; and (2) DAO Token holders 
were widely dispersed and limited in their ability to 
 
135 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.  
136 Id. 
137 See id.  
138 See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
139 See id. at 419. 
140 Id. 
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communicate with one another.”141 This reasoning seems to 
ignore the other rights conferred upon token holders, like the 
Contractor right to pitch and promote smart contracts, the 
right to replace Curators, and the rights to spin-out additional 
DAOs to protect minority interests.142  
The marketing and promotion of the DAO led investors to 
believe that they would be sharing equal, democratic, 
decentralized control. The reality was that the experimental 
and novel model needed “training wheels” and safeguards to 
ensure this democratic and decentralized control would 
successfully function.143 These efforts were technical and 
governance-focused, not investment-focused. Aside from the 
initial, exemplary investment concept said to be introduced by 
Slock.it, the future investment concepts were to be pitched, 
chosen, and executed by token holders and their code 
contributions. 
The voting rights of the token holders were not just 
perfunctory, they were the concept and purpose of the 
business model, and the driving reason for investing in the 
DAO rather than another ICO. The SEC decided that because 
token holders could only vote on contracts white-listed by 
Curators, the voting rights did not constitute meaningful 
control.144 However, token holders are responsible for creating 
and pitching the investment code, in addition to voting on the 
code. The Curator’s role is described in the DAO White Paper 
under the minority token holder protection section—their 
purpose is to protect minority holders from a majority 
attack.145 The authority to block pitches is derived from this 
purpose. Pitches should only be blocked when the code does 
not do what it purports to do, or if there seems to be a scheme 
in which the majority funnels money from the fund into their 
own account.146 The token-holder vote is still the executory 
 
141 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
142 See Jentzsch, supra note 51.  
143 Quentson, supra note 106. 
144 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
145 See Jentzsch, supra note 51.  
146 See id. It is difficult to comment on how this worked in practice, 
since the hack halted DAO operations before the pitch process could begin. 
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controller and decision maker for the DAO’s investment 
strategy. The Curators have no power to spend the DAO’s 
funds or to monetize any assets. All of the profit and loss 
depends upon the action of token holders: Contractors 
pitching valuable code, and enough token holders voting to 
approve sound decisions. 
The SEC claims that Contractors do not provide voters 
with the information necessary to make informed decisions.147 
It may be true that Contractor pitches would not be 
accompanied by an in-depth prospectus. However, the pitches 
are open-sourced smart contracts. All of the decisions which 
would be executed by the pitch would be contained within the 
code, which is visible to all investors. This transparency is at 
the heart of the DAO. After examining the code, the token 
holders can then perform the research necessary to evaluate 
the project. In some ways, this function lends more 
meaningful control than the delegation of duties in a general 
partnership. Token holders have the ability, by way of digital 
code, to simultaneously approve of an investment strategy 
and perform the exact, unalterable execution of that strategy. 
This is not a merely perfunctory right. If token holders like a 
strategy but dislike the execution, they can vote it down and 
pitch alternative code. 
Additionally, the procedural right for token holders in the 
minority to organize and separate their block into a different 
DAO fund (automatically transferring their funds) and elect 
their own Curator adds further weight to voting rights.148 If 
the majority and its Curators seek to take advantage or 
dominate minority token holders, they risk losing those 
minority funds. This is a secondary safeguard to ensure both 
that Curators and Contractors respect the democracy of The 
DAO. In this way, these token holders have more effective 
minority voting rights than do traditional common stock 
voters. 
The SEC claims that the wide dispersion of token holders 
and pseudonymity leads to a lack of communication that 
 
147 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
148 See Jentzsch, supra note 51. 
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makes the voting-right safeguards and meaningful control 
ineffective in reality.149 This understates the Internet’s 
contributions to communications. First, Slock.it hosts an 
online forum where pitches can be openly debated and 
discussed by all token holders and the public in general (like 
a true democracy). There is no evidence that this forum is 
censored or that minority shareholders would be unable to 
utilize this forum to organize a voting block necessary to spin-
off a DAO.150 It is difficult to discern why pseudonymity 
necessarily weighs against organizing a voting bloc, since the 
forum and token blockchain connects the token holders. The 
investors purchasing ICO tokens are going through Bitcoin 
and then Ethereum—they must be technologically savvy. 
While pseudonymity might block names and addresses, those 
are not necessary to communicate online. Avatars and online 
addresses allow information to be shared just as easily, and 
credibility can be assessed by track record of the avatar just 
as credibility is assessed by the background of a named 
person. Dispersion, diversity, decentralization, and even 
pseudonymity are factors that, online, have the potential to 
contribute to a democratic business model. They should not be 
evaluated as presumptively bad for voting power as they 
would be under more archaic schemes. 
3. The Token Holders Have Meaningful Control 
Under Tucker, it is highly possible with these facts that the 
DAO Token is not an investment contract because it allows 
token holders to exercise meaningful control over their 
investment.151 The rights conferred on the token holders, 
because they are more than merely perfunctory voting rights, 
distribute more power than a limited partnership does.152 
Since the token holders are the ones who will necessarily be 
 
149 THE DAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
150 The SEC says this “potentially” makes it difficult to do so. But it is 
unclear why, with the Internet savvy of ICO investors, organizing a 
community online would be unrealistic. Id. at 14.  
151 See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981).  
152 Id. (satisfying the first condition). 
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the smart contract coders, the knowledge and experience of 
token holders are essential to the enterprise.153 Finally, the 
token holders are not dependent on the entrepreneurial 
efforts of any centralized management.154 The token holders 
may one day replace even the need for Curators with their 
own code.155 By passing the three Tucker conditions on joint 
ventures or partnerships, The DAO fails the managerial 
efforts factor of the Howey Test, and therefore, is arguably not 
a security.156 
IV. THE DECENTRALIZED PARTNERSHIP FORM 
AS A SOLUTION 
There may be a localized solution to the risks of fraud and 
failure in ICO fundraising: partnership law. Under the 
Uniform Partnership Act § 202, The DAO could be considered 
a partnership.157 Investors have bought membership in the 
DAO—the rights to the DAO code—in the interest of sharing 
control and profit. Recognizing a Decentralized Partnership 
form in which a large number of partners can be widely 
dispersed and yet share meaningful control—and liability—is 
a natural evolution of law driven by technology. There is no 
limit on the number of partners that can create a general 
partnership.158 By telling token holders that they are 
partners, rather than securities investors, a better signal is 
sent to the developing DAO economy: When a company is 
decentralized, everyone is responsible for each other. 
 
153 Id. (satisfying the second condition). 
154 Id. (satisfying the third condition). 
155 Quentson, supra note 106. 
156 See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008), for an 
application of Tucker to modern and novel business forms beyond simple 
partnerships or joint ventures. 
157 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF STATE LAWS 1997) (amended 2013). 
158 Id. 
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A. The Features of a Decentralized Partnership 
A Decentralized Partnership pitches a partnership 
agreement to the public digitally and disperses it 
geographically, yet garners a legal status similar to that of a 
general partnership. The partnership agreement sent out as 
a smart contract—the ICO token—should address some of the 
key challenges of a partnership, such as the rights to transfer 
partnership interest, the sharing of profits, the sharing of 
liabilities, restriction on dissolution, and the rights and 
methodology for committing the partnership to action. The 
decentralized nature of management and operation should be 
allowed and encouraged, and the solicitation of partnership 
should not be treated as a security, so long as there is minimal 
dependence on the token-promoter as a manager and the 
partners have more than perfunctory voting rights. One way 
to ensure this would be to grant all token holders proportional 
rights and limit the initial investment allowed by founding 
partners.159 If an entity within the Decentralized Partnership 
begins to dominate control, it could then be deemed to be the 
centralized entity responsible for answering to the SEC. This 
would be yet another protection for minority token holders. 
The Decentralized Partnership would share one of the 
essential characteristics of a general partnership: partners 
share profits and losses.160 That includes liability for creditor 
debt and tort debt. This would imply a limitation on 
pseudonymity and require some method of reaching the 
personal assets of token holders. Perhaps the tokens 
themselves could be considered collateral. In a default general 
partnership, the profits and losses are shared equally, 
regardless of the amount of contributions to the 
partnership.161 But this arrangement can be altered by 
 
159 That is, ensure that the founding partners do not initially hold a 
majority of tokens, so that the profits of the investors will not be determined 
by the managerial decisions of the founders. 
160  UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF STATE LAWS 1997) (amended 2013). 
161 Id. 
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contract in the partnership agreement.162 The smart contract 
contained in the Decentralized Partnership Token serves as 
the alteration of the default rules via partnership agreement 
by distributing the rights in section 401 on a pro-rated per-
token basis. 
The differences between a Decentralized Partnership and 
General Partnership are most apparent in the right of 
transfer and exit. While governance rights, as a default, 
cannot be transferred, the allocation and transfer of 
governance rights can also be altered by the partnership 
agreement.163 There does not seem to be a limitation on the 
ability to use a partnership agreement to allow for the free 
transfer of both economic and governance rights via token. 
A default general partnership rule that will be helpful for 
decentralized partnerships to adopt is pass-through taxation. 
In such taxation, “[t]ax income or loss is allocated to partners 
according to the partners’ economic interests in the 
partnership.”164 Partners will responsible for their own taxes, 
which will make the taxing of ICOs and DAOs easier for both 
tax payers and tax collectors. 
Decentralized Partnership Tokens, as smart contracts, 
allow for efficient specification of governance rights—like 
transferability, management authority, and dissolution—that 
might not be practical in many general partnerships. An 
organization can choose to be open-access and democratic, 
explicitly allowing anyone to become a partner regardless of 
financial background. Many partners would be less concerned 
about whether a particular partner lacks the personal assets 
necessary to cover his or her share of liabilities, at least so 
long as the token sale has raised enough assets to make the 
 
162 Id. at cmt. to § 401 (“All of these rules [in Section 401] are, however, 
subject to contrary agreement of the partners as provided in Sections 105 
through 107”). Note that under this section, the distribution of governance 
rights can also be altered by agreement.  
163 While economic rights and governance rights are typically 
“bifurcated” in a general partnership, these rights—and the right to 
transfer these rights—can be altered by agreement. See id. at cmt. to § 503 
(“Unless the partnership agreement otherwise provides . . . .”).  
164 Id. at cmt. to § 405. 
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partnership financially viable as an entity. Regarding 
management authority, a Decentralized Partnership might 
adopt a one-vote-per-token approach to decision-making and 
property management, which is a contractual departure from 
the Uniform Partnership Act default rule that partners 
represent equal parts regardless of proportional 
contributions.165 Alternatively, an organization could decide 
that token owners vote their tokens as a block, which would 
grant more democratic rights to minority token holders. 
Finally, in terms of dissolution, the ease of exit through the 
transfer of tokens makes tougher dissolution protocols 
acceptable. Rather than dissolving a partnership by the whim 
of a single partner, the token could feature a protocol for a 
majority or super-majority vote to dissolve and automatically 
wind down partnership assets. 
A Decentralized Partnership has an essential quality 
differentiating the form from a corporation: there is no 
separation between ownership and control, and as minimal 
separation between ownership and execution of control as 
possible.166 The corporation has the board and management; 
the Decentralized Partnership has the token holders and, only 
if necessary, security-clearing curators. A Decentralized 
Partnership is more difficult to participate in because it 
requires investors to be informed and to continuously 
participate to avoid unwanted liabilities or investments. 
However, the Decentralized Partnership has one extra benefit 
that aligns with corporate forms: the ability to easily transfer 
ownership according to the token terms. Tokens can be traded 
on secondary exchanges, and while these exchanges and 
transactions may have their own regulatory challenges, the 
effect of the secondary market is foundational: creating a 
viable exit strategy. Again, this promotes efficiency and 
democracy because the threat of minority token holders 
withdrawing their profits and then selling their tokens, 
 
165 See id. § 401(f). 
166 Fewer agents by way of automation means fewer agency costs for 
the business, although more time and energy is required of the partners. 
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ch. 6 (1936). 
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perhaps with tokens being purchased by a block, helps keep 
majority tyranny in check. The corporate form allows for wide 
fundraising, dispersed ownership, and diversified portfolio 
ownership. The Decentralized Partnership allows for wide 
fundraising, dispersed ownership, and a trade-off between 
more meaningful control and less portfolio diversification. As 
technology improves and more business models fit into a 
decentralization and democracy understanding, this trade-off 
may become less evident. 
B. The Organic Internalization of Risk 
Being recognized as a partnership establishes not only 
rights, but duties for the partners in a decentralized 
autonomous organization. In The DAO, partnership status 
could help decrease the role of Curators—minority token 
holders would be protected from majority attacks and fraud 
through fraudulent conveyance claims, contract law fraud 
claims, or even breach of fiduciary duty claims. Token holders 
would all owe each other the duties of honesty, loyalty, and 
good faith—many of which the Curators are tasked with 
monitoring. These duties could be enforceable by law, which 
can decrease the need to rely on Curators. Partners in The 
DAO will be forced to comply with the duty of loyalty, and thus 
not take advantage of minority token holders, else face the 
threat of partnership litigation. This encourages democracy 
and responsibility while discouraging insider hacking by 
creating independent causes of action.167 
The threat of liability for all investors can assist the 
maturation of the decentralized ICO market. Because 
partners risk personal liability in the event of tort or creditor 
debts, the partnership founders would need to be transparent 
as to what risks the partners will be exposing themselves if 
they are to attract informed partners to the ICO. Additionally, 
they will need to ensure a higher quality offering because 
partners face a risk of loss potentially greater than their 
 
167 With more parties capable of exercising enforcement (including 
experienced blockchain coders), there is a more credible threat to hackers of 
being caught. 
2018.2_OREN_FINAL  
656 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
initial investment. After the ICO is completed, the partners 
will remain informed and motivated to participate by the 
threat of losing money—partners will not want to end up in 
debt based on the decisions of others. This is yet another boon 
to democracy within the organization. The best performing 
DAOs will attract the most-informed partners, which will 
weed out the weakest DAOs over time.  
While the threat of liability is a motivator for caution, it is 
also a major benefit of decentralization. As more partners are 
added, the magnitude of debt risk decreases because 
partnership liabilities will be spread out over a larger number 
of partners. Further, it discourages investors from purchasing 
too large of a share in the partnership (and thus too much 
liability), unless they can secure their own majority and 
control their risk. This could lead to a larger dispersion of 
ownership and a more diverse democracy.  
Designation as a securities transaction creates barriers to 
decentralization: securities law implicitly requires a 
responsible central authority—the issuer—to adhere to the 
affirmative duties of complying with securities laws. 
Designation as a Decentralized Partnership would have the 
opposite effect: encouraging continued decentralization to 
improve profits and spread out liabilities. A Decentralized 
Partnership facilitated by the right technology (i.e., 
blockchain) can create economies of scale in the costs (e.g., 
research and development and communication between 
partners) of business ownership and liability management, by 
spreading those costs across many, digitally-connected 
partners. 
C. Positive Externalities 
There are several positive externalities that display why 
Decentralized Partnership designations are not only good for 
the participating investors, but also for stakeholders in 
general. Revisit the example of the autonomous car that 
drives around picking up passengers, sharing profits with ICO 
token holders. Who is liable in an accident with a pedestrian? 
If the token is treated as a security, implying at most a limited 
partnership, it is likely that the original coder of the car, who 
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presumably issued the car ICO, would be responsible for 
compensating the pedestrian. In a Decentralized Partnership, 
all car token holders could be held joint and severally liable 
for compensating the victim. The tort victim would have more 
parties to recover from than if they could only look to the 
original coder—who might be insolvent on his or her own.168 
The cost of this liability would be spread out among more 
investors, which means the same compensation to the victim 
with less damage to the business. The victim has more 
opportunities to recover while no single defendant would be 
overly burdened by the liability. 
Avoiding registration has the potential for an additional 
egalitarian outcome. As new token issuers begin to register 
with the SEC, they often do so under safe harbors that limit 
who may purchase the token.169 The Kodak tokens will only 
be available, at least initially, to “accredited investors,” 
meaning any individuals must have either a net worth greater 
than $1 million or annual income greater than $200,000 for at 
least two years.170 These safe harbors, particularly when used 
by established corporate issuers like Kodak, do little to protect 
investors, but deny the average investor the right to 
participate in the new blockchain economy. Exclusionary 
rules do not fit the democratic and egalitarian goals of 
decentralized blockchain business models like The DAO. 
Partnership rules, however, that treat all participants 
equally, for better or worse, fit the concept perfectly. 
 
168 The smart contract embedded in the partnership token could help 
circumvent the liability challenges of pseudonymity. If the business is found 
liable, the funds could automatically be pulled from token holders’ accounts 
to pay debts. With this threat, partners may be more likely to come forward 
to their own defense. Another option would be for tokens themselves to be 
forfeited if the partner does not come forward. 
169 David M. Adlerstein & Joshua Ashley Klayman, A 21st Century 
“Kodak Moment”: The Kodak and WENN Digital Security Token Sale, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/01/126899-21st-century-kodak-
moment-kodak-wenn-digital-security-token-sale/ [perma.cc/JG6M-EGR2].  
170 Id.; Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R § 
230.501(a)(5) (2016).  
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The SEC should not consider a Decentralized Partnership 
Token ICO to be a security in the interest of the potential 
economic benefits of decentralized business models. In the 
future, it may be better for investors to have personal liability 
and fewer centralized protections, so they may be warier of 
the contracts they enter into and the operations they finance. 
That is an organic way to ensure automated business models, 
like the driverless taxi, are coded responsibly, without 
creating unnatural barriers to experimentation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Securities designation triggers duties like registration and 
ongoing disclosures for the issuing entity. For some ICOs, this 
clearly would be an important safeguard for investor safety. 
For other ICOs, disclosures would serve no purpose—the 
purchasers are less interested in governance and more 
interested in the product or service itself. In some unique 
cases, a securities designation would even be 
counterproductive. Choosing a central authority like Slock.it 
to be a securities issuer is arbitrary when the token 
purchasers will be the parties actually creating the 
investment contracts; it is antithetical when an essential 
purpose of investing in the token is to control a share of 
ownership; it is damaging when the goal is to experiment with 
democratic operation. Instead, a Decentralized Partnership 
form can meet the needs of society at large while allowing 
participants the freedom and flexibility to experiment with 
world-changing technology. 
 
